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LIBERAL
Arts
A species of economic liberalism haunted the 80s. Now 
John Hewson threatens to make afar stronger version the 
commonsense of the 90s. But just how well do we 
understand what neo-liberalism is all about? David 
Burchell quizzed British writer Graham Burchell on the
subject.
G raham Burchell is co-editor of The Foucault Effect (London, Harvester, 1991), a book of essays on the late 
French thinker Michel Foucault's 
conception of government. He is currently trans­
lating Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's W hat is 
Philosophy?  He was a visiting scholar at Griffith 
University in August and September.
Your book explores the idea of governm ent and 
'governmentality' associated with the latter work of 
Michel Foucault. One of the themes which arises from 
that is Foucault's understanding of liberalism. What is 
distinctive about that conception of liberalism and how 
does it differ from traditional accounts of liberalism such 
as those of the marxist Left?
For the Left traditionally liberalism has been conceived in 
terms of some kind of ideology—whether it be a dishonest
mystification or a justification of capitalist practices. What 
interests me about Foucault's approach is that he identifies 
liberalism as a way of thinking about governmental ac­
tivities, how governments govern. Foucault identifies 
liberalism as preeminently a critical style of thinking about 
the necessary limits of government. It arose as a criticism 
of the characteristic form of government of the early 
modern period—raison d'etat, or the 'police state'. The as­
sumption of raison d'etat was that states are able to 'know' 
social reality and the economy and able to act to determine 
them in the interests of the state. The decisive point of 
liberalism's critique of this view is its scepticism about the 
state, both about its capacity to know the details of the 
economy and also its capacity to act to determine it.
The Anglo-Scottish tradition of classical liberalism sees the 
economy and more broadly society as a quasi-natural 
domain with its own internal regulations and its own inter­
nal dynamic. Intervention by the state in this domain, 
according to classical liberals, is liable to produce quite
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different effects from those which the state desires—and 
also probably unfortunate effects of some kind or another.
So we're not just talking about a different conception of 
liberalism, but also a different conception of the activity 
of government, and how government relates to the ob­
jects of government.
The view of liberalism that Foucault developed, and that 
we have tried to pursue in our book, is of liberalism as a 
distinctive 'art of government', a way of providing the 
activities of government with a principle of self-limitation. 
Foucault's focus is not so much on the liberal tradition of 
'freedom of the individual' in terms of rights, but on 
freedom of the individual as a technical necessity for the 
ability of the economy to function in terms of its own 
natural dynamic. By an 'art of government' Foucault 
means a way in which the activities of government can be 
rationalised—how they can be thought of in terms of some 
kind of rational principle of what governments can and 
can't do. Foucault's idea of 'governmentality', then, is not 
simply an idea of government in which the state performs 
functions in an instrumental way. It implies an active 
relationship between the state and its subjects or citizens, 
however they're defined. And this is an important part of 
the liberal conception of the practice of government in the 
first place.
One of the features of classical liberalism is to identify the 
economy and society as a kind of natural historical entity 
with its own internal dynamic, with its own internal forms 
of self-government and self-regulation. Liberalism also 
identifies the individuals to be governed as both the object 
of government and the partners of government. Classical 
liberalism—and I would say that is true for modern forms
of liberalism as well—sees the individual not just as a body 
with a set of capacities and internal forces to be shaped by 
a technical know-how, but as a natural reality that has to 
be taken into account in order to be able to govern its 
conduct. And the essential feature of that natural reality is 
its conduct according to a certain kind of rationality—in 
the case of early liberalism, a rationality of interest- 
motivated conduct of economic exchanges, but also con­
ducted by an individual who also has relations on a 
communitarian basis, spontaneous passional relationships 
of enmity and hatred, affiliation, disaffiliation, association 
and so on.
You asked how Foucault's conception differs from the 
classical marxist or Left view. I would say that the Left 
traditionally has never elaborated a distinctive art of 
government. It has traditionally concerned itself with who 
is governing, rather than with how to govern and the prin­
ciples which inform these techniques of government.
It may come as a surprise to people who look at neo­
liberalism today to see the picture you've just created of 
classical liberalism. In a sense classical liberalism is dis­
tinctive as the first serious response to the problem of 
civil society. Yet critics of neo-liberalism today are more 
inclined to say that it has no conception of society as a 
distinct entity. What is the relationship between classical 
liberalism and neo-liberalism in this respect?
For modern forms of neo-liberalism the nature of liberalism 
is still as a kind of critical thought concerning the limits of 
governmental action. For the German school of Ordo 
liberals that developed in the Germany during and after 
the Second World War, and which was very influential in 
the building of the Federal German Republic, the problem
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is marked particularly by the experience of National 
Socialism. Their argument was that National Socialism 
was not some gross aberration, but was the result of anti­
liberal policies which were adopted in the face of the 
perceived consequences of classical liberalism—the 
growth of the 'dangerous classes', and all the social 
problems associated with the growth of industrial society. 
The Chicago School mounted a similar critique of state 
interventionism. The question that is common to both of 
them—although they give slightly different answers—is 
how far can the competitive game of the market function 
as a principle for government itself. So there's both a 
continuity and a discontinuity with classical liberalism.
They're both looking for a principle for rationalising 
government preeminently in relation to the market. Where 
the neo-liberals differ, it seems to me, is that they don't 
regard that form of economic action in the market as being 
the product of human nature. It only exists, and can only 
exist, under certain political, institutional and legal condi­
tions which have to be constructed. And this is another 
point at which Foucault's approach seems to me distinc­
tive; when looking at these varieties of liberalism, he iden­
tifies the production of a set of problems to be solved rather 
than just a theory, or a utopian program, or even a set of 
policies—and least of all an ideology.
But in relation to the question of civil society, neo­
liberalism has a paradoxical aspect. On the one hand it 
argues that society is a product of government intervention 
and construction; society has been shaped by things like 
social insurance, workers compensation, welfare, social 
workers, teachers—the whole social apparatus of govern­
ment. It argues this has become an obstacle to the economy 
and leads to the inexorable growth of the state. So in one 
sense neo-liberalism is anti-civil society, and also anti­
government itself.
Yet in another sense one could see neo-liberalism as a kind 
of autonomisation of society. An example might clarify 
this. In watching the UK experience it has been interesting 
the extent to which the Conservative government, while 
often presented as 'rolling back the state', as returning to 
some kind of Victorian conservatism, has been extraor­
dinarily institutionally inventive in a number of areas.
An example is their education reforms. In one sense they're 
based on an economic model—the model of the enterprise. 
So, for example, each individual school has to operate 
according to a kind of competitive logic. It has to manage 
itself, it has to allocate the resources it is still given by the 
state, it has to carry out the program of the national cur­
riculum set by government, and also carry out tests of 
pupils which are established by government. But within 
that fram ework each individual school is a quasi­
enterprise, which has to engage in a kind of competitive 
relationship with other schools, both in terms of the results 
it tries to get, and thereby the pupils it attracts to the school, 
and therefore more money, and therefore a more successful 
school.
So in one sense there's a kind of economisation of what 
traditionally would have been seen as a public service
institution, something which would traditionally have 
been managed in other ways according to a social service 
philosophy. However, on the other hand, this is still a 
governmental technology; it is still a way of acting on the 
conduct of individuals and populations so as to form their 
conduct and their capacities.
It seems to me, then, that in a number of areas one can see 
taking place a kind of autonomisation of society, and not 
necessarily a destruction of society. It's recasting that space 
that was created by classical liberalism as preeminently the 
space for government, civil society, or 'the social'. A char­
acteristic feature of modern liberalism, which classical 
liberalism created, is this interface between society and the 
state, in which society is instrumentalised for the purposes 
of government. It seems to me that modem forms of 
liberalism are continuing in that vein.
There seems to be a paradox here. A large part of the 
rhetoric of neo-liberalism  is deregulatory. Yet as 
Grahame Thompson and others have pointed out, a large 
part of the practice of, for instance, Thatcherism in Britain 
has been as regulatory in some ways as it has been 
deregulatory in others.
And the same was exactly true of classical liberalism. As 
Colin Gordon puts it in the introduction of our book, 
liberalism doesn't mean a 'bonfire of controls'. On the 
contrary, it means precisely finding those regulations 
which would enable other types of natural regulations to 
work. In the case of modern liberalism it's a matter of 
finding those regulations which would enable a competi­
tive game of entrepreneurial conduct to function to its 
optimum, and to use that as a principle for both limiting 
and rationalising government itself. Government itself in 
a certain sense should become a quasi-enterprise.
One of the striking things about the current political 
debate in Australia which, in some senses, is a debate 
about neo-liberalism, is that both John Hewson and Paul 
Keating are conducting the debate about neo-liberalism 
as if they're talking about classical liberalism. So Paul 
Keating when he wants to attack John Hewson talks 
about Hewson wanting to 'return' Australia to the 19th 
century. But I take you as arguing two things in this 
context: first that their conception of classical liberalism 
is to some extent misplaced; and second that in fact 
neo-liberalism isn't simply a rerun of classical liberalism 
in any case.
I don't want to comment on the Australian situation be­
cause I don't know enough about it, but I think this same 
attitude imposed limitations on the critical response to the 
policies of the Conservative government in the UK during 
the 80s. The situation was quite similar; the Left was accus­
ing the Tories of taking us back to the dark ages of laissez 
faire and the god of the market. On the other hand, Mar­
garet Thatcher tried to 'confiscate critique' from the Left; 
to say the Conservatives were the radicals, that it was 
actually Labour which was the dinosaur.
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That attitude certainly did weaken our ability to under­
stand what was going on, and to think precisely about the 
inventiveness of what was happening—that it was actually 
new. Some American critics have been much more percep­
tive in that regard, pointing out that modem forms of 
economic liberalism have very little in common with the 
people they invoke. They have little in common with Adam 
Smith, and operate an incredibly selective reading of Adam 
Smith, ignoring vast swathes of his work—as well as other 
Anglo-Scottish classical liberals.
‘The Left has never 
developed on art of 
government of its own. ’
So do I understand rightly from what you're saying then 
that part of the problem on the Left is that it fails to 
understand the novelty and sophistication of the liberal 
tradition, and fails to understand that neo-liberalism's 
strength is as an art of government at a time— the last 20 
years or so—when there has been a crisis of confidence 
in the role of government in advanced capitalist societies.
Clearly, there were a number of works produced in the 80s 
which were very perceptive about particular aspects of 
what was going on. People like Stuart Hall working in 
cultural studies, for instance, did develop some fairly far- 
reaching critiques of exactly what was the nature of that 
culture growing up under the name of enterprise culture. 
But generally speaking I think what you say is right. Much 
Left criticism just misrecognised what was happening, and 
saw it as another avatar of capitalist self-interest, a step 
back to the 19th century.
The relationship between government and the economy is 
another aspect of the Left's response. Liberals have pegged 
their conception of government to some form of economic 
rationality, the rationality of the market—whether it be the 
'natural' market of classical liberalism or the constructed 
market of the neo-liberals. Thus they have always had to 
peg this conception to some sense of the performance of 
that economy. It would be rather odd to claim the supe­
riority of liberalism as a rationality of government pegged 
to economic action if the economy fails to perform—al­
though I don't think it's ever been clear, either for classical 
liberalism or modern neo-liberalism, what actually is une­
quivocally going to count as success.
In Britain, under the guise of monetarism, the government 
started off with one indicator, the money supply. That 
became two, then it became three, then other things had to 
be taken into account, then, of course, there were all these 
circumstances which were external. So that sense of liberal 
rationality becomes incredibly blurred. What hasn't be­
come blurred, however, is economic action itself as a prin­
ciple for governmental action. Whether the economy 
performs well or not, nonetheless the enterprise form can
be adopted and have a certain degree of success, even if its 
principal reference point fails to deliver the goods.
That's the sense in which it seems to me liberalism is 
preeminently a reflection on the art of government. The 
way in which liberalism takes hold is in providing a way 
of thinking about government activity and a way of con­
structing techniques for governing, rather than by its suc­
cess measured in economic indicators. I think, broadly 
speaking, Left critiques of neo-liberalism have not taken 
that on board. And they haven't taken it on board precisely 
because the Left has never developed an art of government 
of its own. Socialism has never developed a systematic 
reflection on how to govern, and on inventive techniques 
for governing.
There's a further paradox. In some senses the Left operates 
a double-sided critique. On the one hand it calls upon the 
state to protect us, to provide security for us, to secure our 
jobs and maintain our standard of living. On the other hand 
it critiques the state for constantly growing, interfering in 
our lives, directing our conduct, and so on. So, it has a 
schizophrenic relationship to the state. And I think that's 
partly because its relationship to the state is conceived in 
terms of political sovereignty. At the popular level, much 
Left discourse is pegged to some idea of popular 
sovereignty, and of dem ocratisation as a kind of 
generalised solution for everything, without thinking at all 
about the fact that however democratic any institution is, 
it's still going to have to have methods for managing its 
affairs. There are still going to be forms of power exercised 
over individuals, and there have to be people exercising 
that power over individuals. There are going to be 
problems of government, both in terms of performance and 
in terms of practicability and acceptability of those forms 
of government. Traditionally the Left has been seriously 
weak in developing that side of its thought.
As I said earlier, it is an open question whether there can 
be such a thing as a socialist art of government. That isn't 
to say one might not think of other ways of governing, or 
providing a critical reflection on how we govern ourselves 
and each other, or a critical inventiveness around techni­
ques of doing that are in some sense still attached to critical 
values like increased equity, decreased domination and so 
on. But it is an open question whether one would want to 
call that form of critical reflection socialist. Having said 
that, I would still want to retain one of the traditional 
questions of socialism—one which still poses a serious 
question for an art of government. That is the question of 
how do we live together in such a way that we maximise 
the capacities of each while minimising the restraints on 
how those capacities can be exercised.
Up to this point we've been discussing the failure of the 
radical Left, of the socialist tradition, to create an art of 
government which might provide an alternative to that 
of liberalism. But maybe there's also a broader problem 
here. As the context of the rise of neo-liberalism, par­
ticularly in the anglo-saxon countries, we've seen the 
breakdown of the postwar political 'historic compromise' 
upon which in certain respects postwar social democracy 
was based. And also, economically speaking, of the tools
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and techniques which were loosely labelled Keynesian. 
All of this was associated with social democracy, whether 
or not it was carried out by governments which called 
themselves social democratic. And so neo-liberalism has 
been able to hold the field. It's been able to say: we alone 
have a conception of the proper limits of government 
vis-a-vis society. We alone have an antidote to the 'nanny 
state'.
I'd agree with that. In fact, I'd perhaps qualify something I 
said earlier, in the sense that I'm not sure it is a question of 
creating an 'alternative model'. Any kind of alternative 
way of thinking about government is obviously not some­
thing that is just dreamed up and then proposed; it has to 
start from what is perceived to be a way of identifying the 
problems of government in a definite situation. I don't 
think it's a problem of model-building. And in that sense it 
is a generalised problem which extends to all candidates to 
government in the West in the postwar period.
I wouldn't be quite so pessimistic as you, however. In the 
practice of neo-social democracy in both Germany and 
France, there has been much more imaginative thought on 
the part of a governmental Left, if one can put it that way, 
than there has in the anglo-saxon countries. I'm thinking 
particularly about France around Jacques Delors' wing of 
the Socialist Party.
Might the ground for some neo-social democratic or post­
social democratic art of government then be some of the 
things which neo-liberalism does address but which his­
torically the Left has not been very good at—having more 
of a sense of the proper limits of government, more of a 
sense of the importance of the techniques of government, 
rather than simply the ends of governments?
I'd agree with that. It seems to me the level I'd like to see 
addressed is to start thinking in terms of practical experi­
ments, in terms of ways of governing—for example, in all 
the intermediate areas of society: practical ways in which 
education might be conducted differently, and so on. In that 
regard I'd make one last point. The interesting thing about 
some of the neo-liberal innovations is that they are not 
unambiguously bad; there are things the Left can learn 
from them as techniques and practices of government. This 
maybe true of some of the education reforms in Britain, for 
instance. But I also want to see in that some kind of critical 
valuation of what the costs are, in the sense of the human 
costs of different techniques. I'm not just saying: let's all 
become technocrats. I'm not suggesting it's just a question 
of dreaming up a new gadget of government. I'm suggest­
ing there are more desirable ways of conducting govern­
ment as well.
DAVID BURCHELL (no relation) is ALR's editor.
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